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ABSTRACT: 
Capital structure theorists have argued for different determinants of leverage ratios 
throughout the age of modern corporate finance literature, with thorough empirical 
evidence of key determinants having surfaced in recent years. In this paper I add risk 
aversion into the equation, and find a significant relationship between CEO risk aversion 
proxied by non-firm wealth and leverage ratios. I also find significant relationships 
between percentage of wealth at stake in the company the CEO manages and leverage 
ratios, although this latter finding should be treated with caution due to the contingency 
of causality. 
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INTRODUCTION: 
A recent paper published by Bo Becker (Becker, 2006) suggests that CEOs with higher 
non-firm performance dependent wealth receive stronger incentives. Becker’s findings 
show that Swedish CEOs with higher external wealth independent of the firm receive 
stronger incentives, both in the form of total wealth dependent on company 
performance, as well as their absolute ownership share in the company itself. 
Becker’s study has been replicated by a master’s thesis at the Norwegian School of 
Economics (Wezeman, 2010), using Norwegian companies and CEOs. Wezeman’s 
findings are similar to Becker’s, although the significance on wealth explaining 
incentives received is somewhat weaker in the latter paper. 
An interesting element from before mentioned papers is the use of non-firm wealth as a 
proxy for total risk aversion on behalf of the agent. If risk total risk aversion may be 
proxied by personal wealth, then personal wealth may explain certain behavior and 
actions performed by the CEO. Following this assumption, a wealthier CEO may be 
willing to take on more risk and one should expect a less risk-averse behavior. 
During the recent financial crisis several highly levered firms went into distress, with 
their leverage ratios being a catalyzing effect of their fundamental issues. Following 
these events, a discussion about high leverage and senior managements’ opportunities 
to discretionary adapt a capital structure suitable to their personal ambitions have 
emerged. This discussion may be enchanted to a broader perspective, and to the much 
debated question on whether management have the right incentives to implement 
optimal capital structures for their companies.   
With the previous questions in mind, this study aims to take the research of Becker 
further, and investigate whether CEO risk aversion trough non-firm wealth may 
influence the riskiness of their respective firms. Regressions are run to examine to 
which extent the leverage ratio of Norwegian listed companies may be explained by CEO 
wealth outside of the firm and percentage of wealth dependent of company 
performance. 
Hypothesis: Magnitude of CEO external wealth and percentage of total wealth dependent 
on company performance affects leverage ratios. 
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THEORETICAL BACKGROUND: 
Capital Structure. 
“There is no universal theory of the debt-equity choice, and no reason to expect one. There 
are several useful conditional theories, however. … Each factor could be dominant for some 
firms or in some circumstances, yet unimportant elsewhere.” – Myers (2003, p. 217) 
There exists extensive literature on how firms choose and optimally should choose their 
capital structure. The static Tradeoff Theory, originally proposed by Kraus & 
Litzenberger (1973), suggests that a company chooses its debt with consideration to 
both; (I) marginal benefit of debt, mainly tax shields and management discipline, and (II) 
marginal costs -  bankruptcy and other non-bankruptcy costs such as staff resigning, 
tougher terms from suppliers etc. The tradeoff theory thus predicts that companies 
choose their capital structure based on rational profit and value maximizing. 
A supporting empirical paper for this theory is George & Hwang (2010), who finds that 
companies with high leverage suffers higher distress costs, and suggests that firms 
manage their capital structures to avoid financial distress costs. 
There have surfaced a number of more dynamic models bearing the label Tradeoff 
Theory, notably by Stulz (1990) who explains though his model that adding constraints 
on managerial discretionary investments reduces the costs of over- and 
underinvestment. Morellec (2004) incorporates agency costs into the equation, and 
show that shareholder-management conflicts may explain why debt levels are 
empirically suboptimal. 
The static version of the textbook tradeoff theory has been criticized, most notably by 
Myers (1984) who rather proposes a “pecking order” theory, where a firm has no well-
defined target ratio of debt versus equity. Myers proposes an internal hierarchy of 
financing, where internal financing is preferred over debt issuance, which again is 
preferred over equity financing. The rationale behind the theory is an information 
asymmetry problem, with managers being better informed than the market; First of all, 
management prefers internal financing as no flotation costs arise, and no proprietary 
information that could lead to loss of competitive advantage has to be disclosed to the 
market. When internal financing is depleted, debt issuance is secondly preferred. 
Issuance of debt signals that management has a strong conviction that the company will 
be able to service its debt in the future, and is generally positively received by the 
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market. In case of a share issue, the market will interpret the offering as a signal of 
management taking advantage of a current overvaluation and will thus lead to a drop in 
share price. Share issues are therefore the last resort of financing according to this 
theory, and will only be used when other sources are depleted.  
The pecking order theory does not predict an optimal capital structure, but it suggests 
an explanation for why companies have their observed leverage ratios;  
Myers & Majluf (1984) also suggests that managers will act foremost in the interest of 
current shareholders, and may forego positive-NPV projects in order not to benefit new 
shareholders at the expense of existing shareholders through share issuances. Hawawini 
& Viallet (2010) further brings management incentives into the pecking order theory, by 
suggesting that managers may choose debt over equity, simply to retain control. 
In a more recent years the market timing theory, described as early as 1984 by (Myers, 
1984), has gained renewed support. The theory states that companies will time their 
issues of equity to periods after a rise in equity prices rather than after a fall, as the gain 
from raising equity is higher when prices are relatively high. Further on, a company who 
does not need additional capital may issue equity just to take advantage of a high 
valuation, or may defer issuances if market conditions are unfavorable. This view 
directly contradicts both the tradeoff theory and pecking order theory; If firm value 
rises, the ratio of debt to equity will fall and according to the tradeoff theory firms 
should then issue debt to rebalance, not additional equity. As for the pecking order 
theory, (Myers, 1984) states that the information asymmetry between managers and 
investors does not increase with higher share prices, and that “there is no way firms can 
systematically take advantage of purchasers in a rational expectations equilibrium”. 
While each theory1 has been supported by at least some empirical evidence2, a recent 
study by Frank & Goyal (2009) examines all publicly traded American firms from 1950 – 
2003 in order to determine which main factors explain the ratio of leverage to market 
value of assets. With over 200 000 company-years in their sample, they have identified 
six “core factors” of leverage which are statistically significant (27% of variation 
explained) across several treatments of their data.  
Their significant factors; Industry Median leverage, Tangibility, Profits, Firm Size, Market-
to-book assets ratio and Expected Inflation does not combined support either before 
                                                        
1 For a summarized rewiew of capital structure literature, see (Frank & Goyal, 2008) 
2 see (Harris & Raviv, 1991) & (Titman & Wessels, 1988) 
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mentioned theories. However, five of the factors – the profit factor being excluded – are 
consistent with static tradeoff theory. Their theoretical significance and impact on 
leverage will further be discussed in the Variables section of this paper. 
Managerial Ownership 
CEO and executive management ownership is traditionally perceived as an effective 
agent to align management interests with shareholders, as well as it mitigates risks of 
shirking and managerial opportunism at shareholders’ expense. There is however a risk-
shifting problem with this form of compensation, as a CEO with interests perfectly 
aligned with shareholders may choose a capital structure unfavorable to other 
stakeholders. 
Equity ownership 
Jensen & Mecking (1976) argues in their classical agency-theory paper that CEO 
ownership reduces risk aversive behavior and motivates managers to increase firm risk. 
Equity ownership by management3 is also stated to be an effective agent in reducing 
agency costs and should enhance firm performance. Stein (1988) further argues that 
managerial ownership aligns long-term interests, by discouraging pursuit of short term 
profits and reduces the likelihood of takeovers.  
Several studies have further explored the subject and examined the effect of 
management shareholdings on company value and profitability, their combined results 
are however inconclusive. McConnell & Servaes (1990) show that the percentage of 
shares owned by corporate insiders has a positive linear relationship with the quotient 
Tobins’ q, a ratio of market and replacement value of assets 4. Their study argues that 
the quotient slope will rise until insider shareholdings reach between 40-50%, which 
supports the before mentioned theories of shareholder alignment.  In their paper it is 
further argued that managerial efforts increase with ownership in general, which is 
consistent with standard agency theory. 
Other studies of management shareholdings and Tobin’s q have yielded various results, 
notably Morck, Shleifer & Vishny (1988) who only finds a positive relation between q 
and board member shareholdings in the intervals of 0-5% and over 25%, while the 
                                                        
3 A potential weakness in their model - which for the record is pointed out in their paper - is the assumption 
of the manager having all wealth invested in the company. Although this fact reduces the absolute strength of 
the before mentioned argument, its general validity is still present. 
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relationship is negative in the 5%-25% ownership interval. Holderness, Kroszner & 
Sheehan (1999) also present similar figures in their sample of firms both in 1935 and 
1995.  
Cho (1998) concludes that ownership structure has a significant relation with corporate 
value, but at the same time that ownership structure is a function of corporate value and 
may therefore not be treated exogenously. He further states that previous studies may 
be prone to error due to assumptions of exogeneity. Zhou (2001) also argues that the 
relation may be sensitive to modeling techniques, and that “fixed effects estimators may 
not detect an effect of ownership on performance even if one exists”. 
More recently Yermack (1996) and Cornett, Marcus & Tehranian (2008) does not find 
any evidence of a linear relation between insider shareholding and company 
performance. 
Debt implications 
Aligning CEO incentives with shareholder interests may according to agency theory 
induce management to take on more risk5, and thus increase the leverage ratio of the 
company. Even though shareholders benefit from this shift in financing, bondholders 
may experience reduced wealth as a consequence of increased risk trough default.  
Other studies, notably Shleifer & Vishny (1997) and Barclay & Holderness (1989), point 
to management entrenchment and other non-value increasing behavior as a 
consequence of ownership, which may increase probability of default and thus hurt both 
share- and bondholders. 
The before mentioned arguments on incentive compensation by Stein (1988), Morck, 
Shleifer & Vishny (1988) and others are on the other hand valid from a bondholder 
perspective as well. As managers are incentivized to improve company performance, 
probability of default decreases and bondholder wealth should thus increase. If 
covenants are in place to mitigate managerial opportunism, they should benefit 
bondholders as well. 
CEO Wealth, Equity Incentives & risk aversion 
CEO influence over total changes in company value will always be limited by outside 
factors, and thus equity ownership exposes management to risks beyond their control. 
In a paper on Swedish executives, Becker (2006) states that agency-theory therefore 
                                                        
5 Jensen & Meckling (1976), Demsetz & Lehn (1985), Agrawal & Mandelker (1987) 
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predicts the inherent risk of equity and option compensation to reduce optimal 
incentives.  
Becker’s paper on executive wealth and compensation examines incentives received by 
Swedish CEOs in order to determine whether CEOs with higher wealth receive stronger 
incentives in the form of pay, percentage ownership of firm (Value sensitivity) and 
money-at-stake (Return sensitivity). This follows a theoretical assumption that higher 
wealth results in lower total risk aversion, and that wealthier CEOs require a smaller 
risk premium on their incentive compensation.  
By using taxable wealth data obtained from the Swedish tax authorities on CEOs of 
Stockholm listed companies between 1993 and 1999, he determines that CEO wealth is 
significant in explaining both percentage share of firm and money at stake. Wealth is 
however insignificant in explaining pay levels, and Becker concludes that his findings 
does not support the use of wealth as a proxy for neither CEO skill nor power. 
Becker’s study has been replicated in a Norwegian master’s thesis at NHH (Wezeman, 
2010), who employ mainly the same techniques on 425 CEO observations of Oslo-listed 
companies. Wezeman also finds a positive relationship between CEO wealth and 
incentive strength, and thus strengthens the universal application of Becker’s study. It 
should be noted that the evidence found in Wezeman’s thesis is somewhat weaker, as a 
significant relationship is only observed when explaining percentage ownership (value 
sensitivity), and not CEO value at risk. This is contrary to Becker’s paper, where the 
relationship is positive regardless of measuring value or return sensitivities. 
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VARIABLES: 
This section will first discuss different methods of measuring risk trough leverage ratio, 
and will further cover the theoretical background of the included variables and control 
variables used in this paper. 
Risk and leverage 
Adding leverage to an asset will increase owner risk according to standard textbook 
finance literature6. This is due to the multiplication of losses that the residual claimant 
will bear in the event of a reduction in asset value, as the face value of the obligation to 
the external financing claimant remains fixed until an eventual bankruptcy. The 
multiplication thus entails that adding leverage to a company causes higher volatility in 
both earnings and share prices, the latter being thoroughly explained by Christie (1982). 
Leverage ratios 
When writing a paper examining leverage ratios, one should pay attention to the 
different views on how to measure such and their corresponding argumentation for 
relevance. There are proponents of using both market and book values when calculating 
this ratio, and arguments from both camps should be reviewed. 
As for book leverage, Myers (1977) argues that for the sense of practicality, target debt 
ratios should be set in terms of book leverage. As market fluctuations constantly change 
the market capitalization of a firm, book leverage makes for a more reliable measure 
when developing financing policies. He further states that book values refer to assets in 
place, while market values additionally incorporate the option value of future 
investments. Book values referring to assets in place are thus a better support for debt, 
which is supported by the fact that firms tend to match the maturities of assets and debt.   
In a survey of 392 CFOs, Graham & Harvey (2001) finds evidence that most firms do not 
balance their debt according to changes in equity prices, and that few firms lets market 
equity movements affect debt policy. This fact may be due to the transaction costs of 
rebalancing, which they find moderate evidence of firms considering in their debt 
issuance decisions. Fisher, Heinkel & Zechner (1989) supports this notion, and theorizes 
that firms only rebalance when certain limits are reached. 
                                                        
6 I.e. Bodie, Kane & Marcus (2010) 
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I another paper, Welch (2004) partially agrees with the before mentioned theories 
regarding rebalancing. His findings are that only 40% of changes in debt equity ratios 
are explained by stock market returns. He is however a proponent for employing market 
leverage in the ratio calculations as he states that book leverage is just a plug number 
used to balance assets and financing in the balance sheet, and that it in fact can be 
negative. Barclay, Morellec & Smith (2006) also makes a similar argument through their 
paper on debt capacity. They state that while book values are representations of past 
events, market values are forward looking and anticipate future earnings.  
For Norwegian companies, book values of assets was generally restricted to depreciated 
historical cost as NGAAP (Norwegian Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) was the 
accounting standard used by Norwegian companies until IFRS reporting was made 
mandatory in 2005.  As the book values of equity for the firms in the sample was 
calculated on the basis of  NGAAP until 2005, the book liability ratio is believed to be 
more a function of accounting than other factors, and the emphasis of this thesis is thus 
put on market leverage.  
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Control variables 
Market to book 
According to both tradeoff theory, pecking order theory and market timing theory, the 
market to book ratio should be an important factor in explaining leverage ratios as it is a 
commonly used proxy for investment opportunities. The theories do albeit give very 
different reasons for its significance, as well as whether the correlation should be 
positive or negative. 
According to tradeoff theory, distress costs play an important role in determining the 
optimal leverage ratio for a given firm. As the market-to-book ratio is a proxy for future 
growth opportunities and growth entails higher costs of financial distress, the relation 
should therefore be negative. 
Similarly may firms with a high market-to-book ratio have less debt if one assumes the 
company utilizes market timing to take advantage of a high valuation. 
The pecking order theory does on the contrary predict that firms with higher market-to-
book ratios should have more debt. Following the assumption that debt is used after 
internal financing sources are depleted, firms with higher investments – and thus higher 
PVGO though the market-to-book ratio – will eventually have higher debt ratios than 
firms with less investment activity. 
There are also differing opinions on how the measure of market-to-book ratio should be 
calculated. Both Graham & Rogers (2002) and Lewellen, Loderer & Martin (1987) use 
the market-to-book equity ratio, where market capitalization is divided by the book 
value of common stock. Adam & Goyal (2008) however make a strong argument for the 
use of the market-to-book asset ratio, with their findings of a larger explanatory power 
using the quotient more closely related to Tobin’s q.  
Size 
As company size is important in determining default risk, larger firms should have 
higher debt ratios. Larger firms are generally older than smaller ones, and thus enjoy 
higher trust and better terms when seeking external financing7 which should entail a 
higher debt ratio. On the flip side, older companies may have retained earnings for a 
longer time, and should thus have less debt according to pecking order theory. 
Profits 
                                                        
7 Frank & Goyal, (2009) 
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There are several studies on the subject of profitability and leverage, each with different 
assumptions and results. Intuitively, a profitable firm should benefit more from the tax 
shields that debt financing entail, and should thus have a larger share of debt than less 
profitable firms.  Also, as expected bankruptcy costs are smaller for profitable firms, 
tradeoff theory therefore suggests that profitable firms should have higher debt. 
Jensen (1986) argues that firms with free cash flows may face agency problems, as 
managers may discretionary dispose said cash into new investments and to build 
empires without being monitored by the market in general. The disciplining effect of 
debt may thus entail that profitable firms take on more debt as an agent to mitigate 
principal-agent conflicts. 
Other empirical studies, i.e. Kayhan & Titman (2007) argue that as firms accumulate 
profits and retain earnings, the ratio of debt to equity will fall. This argument is also 
consistent with pecking order theory, where internal financing when available is 
preferred over debt issuance. Kayhan & Titman does however also find that even though 
profitability affects leverage negatively, companies will over longer time spans adjust 
their capital structure to target ratios as explained by tradeoff theory.  
Risk 
As volatility in cash flows enhances the costs of financial distress, companies expecting 
such volatility should choose a less levered capital structure (George & Hwang 2010). 
Frank & Goyal (2009) also point to the reduced probability of fully utilizing the benefits 
of tax shields for such firms, but also argue that volatile firms may take on more debt 
than the tradeoff theory suggests due to adverse selection and frequent requirements 
for additional financing. Volatility may also play a significant factor in determining the 
actual ability of said firms to acquire external financing, at least to an acceptable cost. 
Industry 
It is an indisputable fact that leverage ratios vary across different industries.  Nature of 
assets, volatility, competition, macroeconomic conditions, technological advances, taxes 
and numerous other factors may have specific implications for a certain industry, and 
thus for optimal and/or consequential leverage ratios. This is consistent with all 
previously mentioned leverage theories; if one assumes the tradeoff theory to be 
correct, marginal benefits and costs of debt will vary across industries. Pecking order 
theorists will also have to acknowledge the different relative magnitudes of cash flows 
available for internal financing, the possibility to raise debt due to i.e. nature of assets 
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and finally the market’s willingness to invest in a certain sector. The before mentioned 
arguments will also contribute to explain differences in leverage trough a market timing 
perspective under the assumption of correlation within industries. 
Several earlier papers have pointed out that firms use industry median leverage as their 
target debt ratio, and that industry median leverage is significant in explaining the ratio 
in larger datasets. In papers examining target debt ratios, Hovakimian, Opler & Titman 
(2001) and Flannery & Rangan (2006) both point to median industry leverage as target 
leverages, and find consistency between the industry leverages and leverage for the 
companies in their regressions. In the comprehensive study by Frank & Goyal (2009), 
industry median leverage is also highly significant in explaining capital structure, and is 
considers as one of their “core factors” of leverage. 
Another justification for industry leverage as a control variable is the likelihood that the 
variable will capture other industry specific omitted variables. In the case of this paper, 
available consistent data on the nature of assets for each company is limited. As the 
nature of firm assets may be an important factor in explaining leverage from all 
theories8, there is a potential loss of explanatory power from the regression performed 
below. Industry median leverage thus becomes even more important, as it at least 
partially will take into account the different assets held by a company in an industry 
(even if it will be with wider strokes than preferential.) 
 
                                                        
8 Frank & Goyal (2009) 
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DATA AND METHODOLOGY: 
Norwegian tax figures 
This thesis attempts to use non-firm dependent wealth as a proxy for risk aversion using 
wealth figures from the Norwegian tax authorities. There are however drawbacks of 
using the reported figures as they are prone to several sources of error for the purpose 
of this thesis. Also, the findings of this paper may not be replicated directly outside of 
Scandinavian countries due to several aspects which will be discussed in the following. 
The Norwegian tax authorities automatically collect information from the central 
securities depository (VPS), banks, employers, insurance companies, pension providers 
and other public and non-public institutions each year in order to determine the income 
and wealth of each Norwegian taxpayer. The taxpayer is in the following year presented 
with a pre filled tax form and may submit documented corrections before tax is 
calculated. The tax authority’s opportunity to gather information on holdings of assets in 
other countries is however limited, and the system to some extent relies on the 
taxpayers to report such holdings to the authorities under a regime of sanctions if they 
are found to be underreporting their real assets and their value. The limitations of the 
authorities’ reach outside of Norway may lead to tax evasion trough holdings in offshore 
accounts, and final wealth figures may be underreported. As Norway currently taxes 
wealth with 1.1% percent per year over a minimum threshold of 750 000 kroner (2012), 
there are substantial incentives for persons with large fortunes to relocate assets to 
other countries where reporting is less stringent. 
When calculating wealth, the Norwegian tax code allows for deductions of mortgages 
and other liabilities the taxpayer has acquired. This means that the taxable wealth 
figures only are net of any obligations on the taxpayers’ behalf. As homeownership in 
Norway is very common (73% of households in 2009 according to Statistics Norway) 
and mortgages are favorable due to deductibility of principal and interest payments in 
calculations of capital tax and income tax respectively, the net wealth figures are 
understated to a large extent. This can be observed in the sample used in this thesis, 
where 158 of 663 CEO-years have zero taxable wealth.  
Another fact contributing to lower wealth figures is the assessment values put on 
different asset classes by the tax authorities. Real estate that serves as the taxpayer’s 
primary residence is for instance on average valued at 25% of market value, while the 
figure for secondary homes is 40%. There is also a cap on the assessment values, and 
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primary and secondary residences may not have taxable values over 30 and 60%. Year 
2009 estimates by Statistics Norway show that while 65% of the gross wealth of 
Norwegian households is invested in own dwellings , the tax-assessed values of said 
dwellings is only 19 % of gross household wealth (Epland & Kirkeberg, 2012).  Holdings 
of other assets like exchange listed securities are valued at closing price per 31.dec, but 
for unlisted companies the taxable value equals the book value of the companies. 
Even though the figures for wealth may be grossly understated, they are (without the 
possibility of tax evasion) equally calculated for each individual. If one assumes that 
every CEO is optimizing his/her behavior according to the tax code, then taxable wealth 
should serve as a good proxy for wealth and thus total risk aversion. 
The replication of the results of this paper outside of Scandinavia may be difficult due to 
several reasons:  
First of all, the desire for transparency by the current government in Norway has led to 
tax figures being made publicly available. Any Norwegian may request tax data on 
another person from the last tax year through a web search engine provided by the tax 
authorities. Also, the authorities provide tax data for several years back for research 
purposes (as for this thesis) without any need for consent from the taxpayers being 
researched. The figures publicly available are however limited to taxable wealth, taxable 
income and taxes paid, which makes estimations of true values for wealth figures 
difficult. 
Secondly, the wage structure of the Norwegian (and Scandinavian) societies entails a 
large degree of income equality across professions and job hierarchies. Average salaries 
are high compared to other western countries, while executive compensation is 
relatively lower than in other western countries.  
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 Data  
Sample 
The data in this sample consists of companies listed on the Oslo stock exchange in the 
period from 1998 to 2011. As more detailed data is available for companies in recent 
years, this might lead to a bias toward younger companies in the sample. To adjust for 
this fact, a requirement for inclusion in the sample is that the company was listed in 
2008, which eliminates companies introduced to the exchange in 2009 and after. The 
sample consists of 75 of the largest 100 companies listed on the Oslo stock exchange in 
2008 measured by market capitalization of both A and B stock. Data on the companies 
are from the year 1998 to 2011, or from the year the company was first listed. Two large 
Norwegian companies, DNB and Storebrand, were omitted from the sample due to their 
regulated nature and different accounting practices which makes calculations and 
estimations of important variables difficult (Banking and Insurance). 
The sample consists of a total of 663 CEO-year observations, with 146 different 
individuals. A few CEOs have held 2 positions during different points in time, and 1 CEO 
have held the executive position in 2 companies at once. The average age is 50.16 years 
and average tenure for each CEO is 6.81 years. The average time each company has been 
listed on the Oslo stock exchange is 11.09 years. 
Collection 
The data in the sample is gathered from several public and non-public sources. To 
ensure consistency in the sample, each type of data used has been acquired from a single 
source when possible. 
Initial data on CEO age, tenure, shareholdings and options are gathered from annual 
reports and in a few instances from correspondence with companies’ respective investor 
relations departments. Age and person were again confirmed by both public databases 
such as proff.no, and by correspondence with the tax authorities in order to confirm that 
data for the right person was requested.  
Data on wealth was obtained from the tax authorities in Norway (Skatteetaten). As there 
are strict control routines on what data is distributed, the tax authorities will only 
submit data if there is an absolute match between the person requested and the person 
on file. If any persons have the same name and the same birth year, manual searches 
must be performed to confirm identities. As information for this thesis was requested 
during the busy spring season, the sample was reduced by 8 data-points due to persons 
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having equal names and due to the demise of 2 individuals for which tax data is no 
longer available. 
Accounting data was gathered using a Bloomberg terminal (codes supplied in the 
following variables section), and supplemented by the accounting database Amadeus at 
the Norwegian School of Economics, the accounting database from FactSet,  and annual 
reports.  
Expected inflation figures were gathered from the yearly statistical publication 
“Economic Outlook” (Økonomisk Utsyn in Norwegian), published by Statistics Norway. 
GNP deflator estimates were obtained from the website of the World Bank, and was later 
confirmed by correspondence with Statistics Norway. 
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Description of variables 
Variable definitions 
TDM (Total debt to market) 
This Leverage ratio was calculated by dividing total liabilities (Bloomberg 
BS_TOT_LIAB2) by market capitalization. Market capitalization was calculated by 
multiplying shares outstanding (Bloomberg BS_SH_OUT) with closing share price as of 
31. Dec (Bloomberg PX_LAST) 
WIND_TDM (Winsorized Total debt to market) 
TDM Winsorized at the 0.5 percentile in both ends. 
TDM_FULL (Interest bearing debt to market) 
Another leverage ratio, consisting of Long-term interest bearing debt (Bloomberg 
BS_LT_BORROW) + current portion of long term debt (BS_ST_BORROW) divided by the 
market value of assets. Market value of assets was calculated as Market capitalization + 
Long-term interest bearing debt (Bloomberg BS_LT_BORROW) + current portion of long 
term debt (BS_ST_BORROW) – Deferred taxes and investment tax credit (From FactSet) 
TDB (Total liabilities to Book) 
Leverage ratio of total liabilities (Bloomberg BS_TOT_LIAB2) divided by the book value 
of shareholder equity (Bloomberg TOTAL_EQUITY) 
WIND_TDB (Winsorized Total liabilities to Book) 
TDB Winsorized at the 0.5 percentile in both ends. 
Ln Non-Firm wealth (Real) 
Ln Non-Firm Wealth was calculated by taking the natural logarithm of taxable wealth 
minus value at risk. Value at risk was calculated by multiplying the number of shares 
held by the CEO at year-end by closing price per 31. Dec (Bloomberg PX_LAST) added 
with the number of options held by the CEO multiplied with 0,6 and again with closing 
price per 31 Dec. (Bloomberg PX_LAST). The resulting figures were inflated/deflated to 
2005 figures by using a Norway-specific GNP deflator obtained from the World Bank. 
Percentage of taxable wealth at stake (Wealth at stake) 
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Percentage wealth at stake was calculated by dividing the CEO value at risk with taxable 
wealth. If the CEO value at risk was higher than the taxable wealth, the value was set to 
100%. Value at risk was calculated by multiplying the number of shares held by the CEO 
at year-end by closing price per 31. Dec (Bloomberg PX_LAST) added with the number of 
options held by the CEO multiplied with 0,6 and again with closing price per 31 Dec. 
(Bloomberg PX_LAST). 
Percent ownership 
Percent ownership was calculated by dividing value at risk with market capitalization. 
Value at risk was calculated by multiplying the number of shares held by the CEO at 
year-end by closing price per 31. Dec (Bloomberg PX_LAST) added with the number of 
options held by the CEO multiplied with 0,6 and again with closing price per 31 Dec. 
(Bloomberg PX_LAST). Market capitalization was calculated by multiplying shares 
outstanding (Bloomberg BS_SH_OUT) with closing share price as of 31. Dec (Bloomberg 
PX_LAST) 
Stock volatility  
Volatility figures in the regression are 360 days Bloomberg calculations (Bloomberg 
VOLATILITY_360D) 
Median industry leverage 
Industry median leverage is calculated as the median leverage ratio (Calculated like 
TDM) of clusters based on 2-digit GICS-Codes9 for all firms listed on Oslo Exchange in the 
sample period. 4 or 6 digit specification would be preferred to capture more detailed 
industry specifics, but due to the limited number of listed companies on Oslo Exchange (I.e. 
2 airlines, 2 telecom providers) the broader definition was used. 
Profitability 
Profitability is calculated as EBITDA (Bloomberg EBITDA) over total assets (Bloomberg 
BS_TOT_ASSET) 
WIND_Profitability 
Profitability winsorized at the 05% level in both ends, 
                                                        
9 GICS codes are the standard industry classification used by the Oslo Exchange, by nature similar to SIC 
codes. 
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Log of assets 
Log of assets is the natural logarithm of total assets (Bloomberg BS_TOT_ASSET) 
deflated/inflated to 2005 figures by using a Norway-specific GNP deflator obtained from 
the World Bank. 
Tangibility 
Tangibility of assets is calculated as net property, plant and equipment (FactSet Net 
PPE) over assets (Bloomberg BS_TOT_ASSET). 
Market-to-book 
As market value of debt is difficult to obtain for such a large sample, a proxy was made 
to capture most of the PVGO in this figure. The market-to-book asset ratio was 
calculated by dividing market capitalization by assets (Bloomberg BS_TOT_ASSET).  
Market capitalization was calculated by multiplying shares outstanding (Bloomberg 
BS_SH_OUT) with closing share price as of 31. Dec (Bloomberg PX_LAST). 
WIND_Market-to-book 
Market-to-book winsorized at the 0,5% level in both ends. 
Expected inflation 
The figures for expected inflation are acquired from Statistics Norway (SSB) and are SSB 
beginning of year estimates of KPI-JAE, which is a consumer price index adjusted for 
taxes and energy commodities. The rationale behind using this figure is that the 
Norwegian Central bank uses this adjusted measure when setting their key policy rate 
and it is the measure generally used when estimating inflation in mainland Norway. 
NIBOR 
NIBOR is the 12 month Norwegian Interbank Offer Rate in December of the current 
accounting year, obtained from the Central Bank of Norway 
Term Spread  
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Term spread is the spread between 10 year government bonds and 12 month 
certificates in December of the current accounting year. Data on bonds and certificates10 
obtained from the Central Bank of Norway. 
  
                                                        
10 The rates of some certificates are synthetic, and are calculations made by the Central Bank of Norway 
due to lack of offering. 
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Descriptive statistics 
The following table (Table 1) presents descriptive statistics of the sample used in the 
regression.  
In Panel A, sample statistics per observation year not used in the regression may be 
observed. The mean CEO age is 50 years and average tenure is 6.81 years. Mean wealth 
per year is 41.40, while the median value is 3.93 million NOK. The companies have been 
listed an average of 11.9 years per observation year, and the average market 
capitalization is 15.6 million NOK. 
Panel B presents summary statistics of all variables used in the regressions. Due to 
missing data in the sources used, TDM_FULL, percentage ownership, volatility and 
tangibility have slightly less observations than the total sample of 663 observation 
years. The leverage ratios TDM and TDB have either a very high maximum or minimum 
observation, which may be caused by unusual events and/or circumstances (Maximum 
TDM is 56.86 while minimum TDB is -22.63). The irregularity of these observations is 
confirmed by observing the maximum and minimum values of the winsorised ratios, 
WIND_TDM and WIND_TDB, where the maximum TDM is 26.67 and the minimum TDB 
is 0.09. In the explanatory variables, percentage ownership ranges from 0 to 70.77 with 
a median observation of 22%, while the median CEO’s wealth at stake is 100%.  
The figures for profitability and market-to-book also show very high maximum and/or 
minimum values, which irregularity may be confirmed by observing the less extreme 
values found in the winsorized (0,5%) ratios. 
Panel C and D presents taxable wealth and non-firm wealth respectively for the CEOs in 
the sample for each year. Both mean and median value of taxable wealth has doubled 
during the 14 sample years, while mean and median non-firm wealth has increased 3 to 
4 times the 1998 figures. The distribution of wealth among CEOs is very skewed in all 
observation years, as may be observed when comparing the mean and median values 
where the latter is between 4 and 10 times higher. Non-firm wealth has a median value 
of zero in 12 of the 14 years, while the lowest observed median value of taxable wealth 
is 1.39 MNOK in all sample years. This observation may to some extent be attributed to 
the different tax assessment values of equity and real estate, but may also indicate 
strong CEO incentives throughout the sample. 
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Panel E presents a pairwise correlation matrix between the independent variables used 
in the regressions. From observing the table it can be concluded that all explanatory 
variables (Wealth at stake, percent ownership and non-firm wealth) are highly 
correlated, which implicates that separate regressions should be performed for each 
explanatory variable. Term spread, NIBOR and expected inflation are as anticipated also 
highly correlated (significant at the 0.1% level). As these variables are largely founded 
on the same macroeconomic forecasts, only one should be necessary to control for 
macroeconomic outlook (the “results” section includes this consideration which involves 
weighting of explanatory power of the regression and significance). 
Panel F presents pairwise correlations between leverage ratios and the independent 
variables. Both wealth at stake and non-firm wealth show significant correlations with 
the leverage ratios, ownership percentage is however uncorrelated.  TDM, TDM_FULL 
and WIND_TDM have significant correlations with all key variables from Frank & Goyal 
(2009), with the exception of expected inflation. As this proxy for expected yield curve 
also is considered in the NIBOR and Term Spread variables, expected inflation is thus 
dropped from subsequent regressions. The correlations between book leverage, TDB 
and WIND_TDB, and independent variables are of less significance than the market 
based leverage ratios, which supports the findings of Frank & Goyal (2009) and the 
notion of book equity to be a plug number. There is no notable difference in correlations 
regarding winsorization of Market-to-book and profitability.  
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Table 1 
Sample overview 
Summary statistics for the sample of 75 companies listed on Oslo Stock exchange for the period of 1998-2011. 
Observation years where data is missing are omitted. Panel A present pooled statistics on the companies and 
their CEOs. CEO age is the age of the CEO in the observation year. Tenure is the number of years the CEO has 
held the position, where 1 is the first year. CEO wealth is taxable wealth obtained from the Norwegian tax 
authorities. Time listed on Oslo Exchange is the number of years the company has been listed in the 
observation year. Market Cap is the market capitalization of the company, calculated by multiplying closing 
price per 31. Dec with shares outstanding per 31. Dec. Volatility is return volatility. Panel B Presents summary 
statistics of variables used in tests. Leverage ratio is book value of liabilities divided by market capitalization. 
Wealth at stake is the percentage (in decimal numbers) of CEO wealth tied to company performance. % 
Ownership is the percentage the CEO holds of the equity. Ln non-firm wealth is the natural logarithm of CEO 
wealth, wealth at stake subtracted. Ln market Cap is the natural logarithm of the market capitalization (Size). 
Profitability is EBITDA over book value of assets. Ln Assets is the natural logarithm of book assets, 
deflated/inflated to 2005 figures. Market-to-book is market capitalization over book value of assets. Expected 
inflation is the year-start expected KPI-JAE as estimated by Statistics Norway. Median leverage is the median 
industry leverage ratio, calculated as total liabilities divided by market capitalization, Clustered by 2-digit GICS-
Codes for all firms listed on Oslo Exchange in the sample period. NIBOR is the Norwegian Inter Bank Offer Rate 
as of 31. Dec current year. Term Spread is the spread in interest rates between 10-year bonds and 12 month 
certificates from the Norwegian Central Bank. The prefixes WIND_ refer to a 0.5% winsorization in both ends. 
Panel C presents taxable wealth as presented by the Norwegian tax authorities. Panel D presents Non-firm 
wealth which is total wealth minus the value of CEO share- and option holdings in the employing firm. Panel E 
presents variable correlations between independent variables in the pooled sample. Panel F presents variable 
correlations between leverage ratios and independent variables. *,** and *** denotes significance at the 5%, 
1% and 0,1% level 
Panel A: Summary statistics of sample (Pooled) 
 Mean Median  
CEO Age 50.16 50.00  
Tenure 6.81 5.00  
CEO Wealth (MNOK) 41.40 3.93  
Time listed on Oslo Exchange 11.90 9.00  
Market Cap (MNOK) 15,599.99 3,208.93  
Panel B: Summary statistics of variables 
 Observations Mean Std. D. Min 25th Median 75th Max 
TDM 663 1.75 3.82 0.01 0.45 0.88 1.73 56.86 
WIND_TDM 663 1.68 3.12 0.02 0.45 0.88 1.73 27.67 
TDM_FULL 608 0.36 0.25 0.00 0.17 0.33 0.54 1.14 
TDB 663 1.79 2.02 -22.03 0.97 1.50 2.21 19.20 
WIND_TDB 663 1.80 1.46 0.09 0.97 1.50 2.21 11.45 
Wealth at stake 663 0.73 0.39 0 0.41 1 1 1 
% Ownership 641 4.66 12.13 0 0.03 0.22 1.27 70.77 
Ln non-firm wealth 663 5.56 7.52 0 0 0 14.49 20.64 
Volatility 643 48.24 23.91 0.49 31.99 41.4 58.17 214.13 
Profitability 663 0.10 0.13 -1.25 0.06 0.1 0.15 0.56 
WIND_Profitability 663 0.11 0.11 -0.36 0.06 0.10 0.15 0.46 
LN Assets 663 8.54 1.59 4.34 7.54 8.55 9.46 13.28 
Tangibility 589 0.39 0.31 0.00 0.12 0.30 0.65 3.01 
Market-to-book 663 1.08 1.4 0.02 0.38 0.67 1.15 13.57 
WIND_Market-to-book 663 1.07 1.34 0.03 0.38 0.67 1.15 9.42 
Median leverage 663 1.06 0.45 0.09 0.91 1.10 1.10 2.11 
Expected Inflation 663 1.93 0.65 0.3 1.5 2.2 2.3 2.7 
NIBOR 663 4.60 1.71 2.21 3.06 4.01 6.33 7.19 
Term Spread 663 0.65 1.00 -0.64 -0,24 0.83 1.33 2.42 
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Panel C: Taxable Wealth 
(100.000 NOK) 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
25th percentile 0.00 2.80 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19 13.25 8.68 22.91 4.12 0.00 2.83 0.00 
Median 30.14 15.55 16.25 16.45 13.99 17.35 36.91 57.76 73.13 96.71 41.28 75.17 50.30 62.39 
Mean 263.56 385.13 482.06 240.95 148.78 161.14 254.01 216.38 438.10 757.60 369.42 718.61 423.22 574.09 
75th percentile 473.12 501.52 134.84 90.34 59.27 37.26 130.42 209.31 222.71 379.79 208.45 292.32 182.17 269.80 
Max 1254.52 2607.36 8421.11 2882.15 1353.42 1725.95 2777.05 3041.63 4042.23 16727.98 4305.84 9659.33 4114.63 6108.60 
Observations 25 30 34 37 41 38 44 51 61 67 69 46 61 60 
Panel D: Non-Firm Wealth 
(100.000 NOK) 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
25th percentile 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Median 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,87 0,00 0,00 0,03 
Mean 79,60 16,19 20,18 29,47 34,80 28,27 43,70 41,35 77,55 220,64 163,60 77,93 108,13 307,65 
75th percentile 23,21 2,08 0,00 0,00 10,73 0,00 0,45 32,09 9,68 59,01 95,96 15,95 40,17 80,95 
Max 788,00 394,74 620,68 969,86 664,14 956,56 973,19 402,36 2340,10 9229,13 3021,72 1080,48 2107,16 4576,63 
Observations 25 30 34 37 41 38 44 51 61 67 69 46 61 60 
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Panel E: Pairwise correlations between independent variables 
 Wealth at 
stake 
Ownershi
p 
Ln Non-
firm 
Volatility Profitabilit
y 
W_Profita
b. 
Ln Assets Mk-T-B W_Mk-T-B Exp. 
Inflation 
Median 
Lev. 
NIBOR Term 
Spread 
Tangibility 
Wealth at 
stake 
1.000              
               
Ownership 0.186 1.000             
 (0.000)***              
Ln Non-firm -0.739 -0.178 1.000            
 (0.000)*** (0.000)***             
Volatility -0.052 0.001 -0.021 1.000           
 (0.191) (0.983) (0.594)            
Profitability -0.077 -0.069 0.029 -0.183 1.000          
 (0.047)* (0.080) (0.451) (0.000)***           
W_Profitab. -0.075 -0.074 0.019 -0.195 0.941 1.000         
 (0.053) (0.062) (0.633) (0.000)*** (0.000)***          
Ln Assets -0.016 -0.122 0.132 -0.218 0.287 0.288 1.000        
 (0.677) (0.002)** (0.001)** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***         
Mk-T-B 0.119 -0.097 -0.171 -0.006 0.018 0.021 -0.420 1.000       
 (0.002)** (0.014)* (0.000)*** (0.876) (0.647) (0.595) (0.000)***        
W_Mk-T-B 0.116 -0.097 -0.171 -0.011 0.019 0.016 -0.428 0.979 1.000      
 (0.003)** (0.014)* (0.000)*** (0.779) (0.633) (0.684) (0.000)*** (0.000)***       
Exp. Infl. -0.061 0.022 0.034 -0.156 -0.014 -0.005 -0.046 0.040 0.049 1.000     
 (0.119) (0.582) (0.378) (0.000)*** (0.728) (0.900) (0.234) (0.298) (0.212)      
Median Lev. -0.193 -0.047 0.192 -0.167 0.159 0.149 0.255 -0.340 -0.346 0.010 1.000    
 (0.000)*** (0.239) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.789)     
NIBOR -0.050 0.055 0.004 0.146 -0.058 -0.042 -0.027 -0.097 -0.107 0.556 0.010 1.000   
 (0.194) (0.165) (0.919) (0.000)*** (0.136) (0.280) (0.493) (0.013)* (0.006)** (0.000)*** (0.800)    
Term Spread 0.074 -0.042 -0.050 -0.081 0.046 0.024 0.007 0.082 0.089 -0.644 -0.011 -0.946 1.000  
 (0.057) (0.287) (0.201) (0.041)* (0.240) (0.534) (0.853) (0.034)* (0.022)* (0.000)*** (0.779) (0.000)***   
Tangibility -0.258 -0.020 0.145 -0.097 0.158 0.145 0.276 -0.248 -0.254 -0.054 0.225 -0.011 0.037 1.000 
 (0.000)*** (0.636) (0.000)*** (0.020)* (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.187) (0.000)*** (0.781) (0.365)  
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Panel F: Pairwise correlations between leverage ratios and independent variables 
 TDM TDM_FULL TDB WIND_TDM WIND_TDB 
Wealth at stake -0.134 -0.191 -0.081 -0.133 -0.126 
 (0.001)** (0.000)*** (0.037)* (0.001)** (0.001)** 
Ownership % 0.035 0.080 -0.019 0.044 -0.031 
 (0.371) (0.052) (0.633) (0.267) (0.427) 
Ln Non-firm wealth 0.121 0.172 0.101 0.119 0.121 
 (0.002)** (0.000)*** (0.010) (0.002)** (0.002)** 
Volatility 0.343 0.164 0.028 0.347 0.171 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.475) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Profitability -0.130 -0.169 0.013 -0.135 0.002 
 (0.001)** (0.000)*** (0.735) (0.000)*** (0.958) 
W_Profitability -0.149 -0.176 0.006 -0.150 -0.010 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.885) (0.000)*** (0.795) 
Ln Assets 0.092 0.229 0.046 0.111 0.073 
 (0.018)* (0.000)*** (0.241) (0.004)** (0.060) 
Mk-T-B -0.243 -0.604 -0.182 -0.279 -0.256 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
W_Mk-T-B -0.249 -0.586 -0.186 -0.292 -0.263 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Exp. Infl. 0.008 -0.059 0.044 0.010 0.050 
 (0.831) (0.146) (0.258) (0.798) (0.195) 
Median Lev. 0.083 0.187 0.161 0.107 0.222 
 (0.033)* (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.006)** (0.000)*** 
NIBOR 0.172 0.126 0.048 0.187 0.060 
 (0.000)*** (0.002)** (0.219) (0.000)*** (0.124) 
Term Spread -0.154 -0.113 -0.053 -0.173 -0.056 
 (0.000)*** (0.005)** (0.176) (0.000)*** (0.153) 
Tangibility 0.099 0.511 0.110 0.132 0.158 
 (0.016)* (0.000)*** (0.008)** (0.001)** (0.000)**** 
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Methodology 
Dimension specific effects 
The dataset contains observations on specific firms and CEOs over several years, and 
thus caution must be exercised when considering the appropriate statistical 
methodology; The leverage ratio of a firm is likely highly correlated over time, the same 
is likely for CEO wealth, both invested in own firm and total figures. Macroeconomic 
factors and the two turbulent periods of financial turmoil during the sample years also 
suggest that there will be time-specific effects that may influence the sample. The 
presence of dependence in the residuals is thus possible on both a firm and time basis, 
which must be considered when selecting the appropriate model. 
If the residuals are not dependent and identically distributed, ordinary least squares 
regressions (OLS) and White standard errors will be biased. In order to capture and 
control for such correlation, several methods have been and are currently used; If only 
cross-sectional time correlation is present, a Fama-MacBeth approach may be used to 
correct the standard errors. This method does however yield downwards biased 
standard errors if a firm effect is present, as presented in a paper by Petersen (2009). 
Clustering by one dimension (i.e. firms) in the regression is another approach widely 
used, as the White standard errors will be corrected for correlation (also known as 
Rogers standard errors). To capture any other effect with this method, dummies for the 
other parameter may be used to control for correlation within this dimension, and 
standard errors should thus be unbiased if the sample is great enough. 
In the presence of both time- and firm effects, Petersen (2009) also proposes a 
methodology of two-dimensional clustering, where standard errors will be unbiased in 
both dimensions. Petersen also argues that this approach will produce correctly sized 
confidence intervals, regardless of whether the firm effects are fixed or temporary. As 
the methodology suggested by Petersen does capture the potential dependence in 
residuals on both a time and firm basis, it is thus suitable for the purposes of this paper 
if such effects are present. Said methodology has also been utilized in papers facing 
similar issues as this paper, notably Frank & Goyal (2009) and Jain et al. (2013). 
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Model Selection 
When considering which model to utilize, standard errors were observed for the 
different methodologies mentioned above on the 663 observation dataset. First, an OLS 
regression with White standard errors was performed. A subsequent regression with 
clustering in the time dimension yielded considerably larger standard errors which 
strongly indicate a time effect. When also clustering by firm, the standard errors were 
even greater, which led to the conclusion that both a time and firm effect is present in 
the sample. The two dimensional clustering approach suggested by Petersen (2009) is 
thus utilized for the subsequent statistical analyses.  
In order to determine which variable should be used to proxy for inflation/yield curve, 
regressions with all leverage ratios and explanatory variables was run, with either 
NIBOR or Term spread as the interest/yield component. Analysis of the AIC and BIC 
values showed a slightly better model using Term Spread, which thus became the 
control variable used in the regressions presented in the following. 
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RESULTS: 
Regressions were run separately on all leverage ratios, with either Non-firm wealth 
(Table 2) or wealth at stake (Table 3) as the explanatory variable. For the winsorized 
leverage ratios, WIND_TDM and WIND_TDB, winsorized control variables were used for 
market-to-book and profitability. 
Non-firm wealth 
On the liabilities/market value of equity ratio (TDM), non-firm wealth shows a highly 
significant positive correlation (significant at the 0,2%-level). The coefficient of the log 
transformed variable is however small (0.052), and implies that a 1 percent increase in 
non-firm wealth would increase leverage ratio by 0,052% all other variables kept equal. 
A 50% increase in non-firm wealth would however involve a 2.6% increase in the 
leverage ratio, which is an interesting finding as this assumption is feasible.  
In order to examine whether the findings in the regressions on liabilities/market value 
of equity are abnormal due to extreme observations, a regression was also performed on 
the winsorized (at the 0,5% level) leverage ratio, WIND_TDM. The still positive 
coefficient in this regression is slightly smaller (0.038) but still shows a highly 
significant correlation (1%). 
On the leverage ratio considering only interest bearing debt (TDM_FULL), non-firm 
wealth shows a positive significant correlation, although the significance is lower (only 
significant at the 10%-level) and the coefficient smaller (0.002) than in the TDM 
regressions. As a 100% increase in non-firm wealth would only increase the leverage 
ratio by 0.2%, the effect of non-firm wealth on this leverage ratio could be described as 
marginal, although significant.  
The regression on liabilities over book leverage (TDB) only show significant correlations 
with the market-to-book ratio and industry median leverage, which is consistent with 
previous statements. This effect should not be caused by extreme observations, as the 
regression on the winsorized book leverage ratio (WIND_TDB) yields similar results, 
with no significant correlation with non-firm wealth.  
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Table 2 
Regressions of leverage ratios on non-firm wealth 
The results of the regressions of leverage ratios on non-firm wealth are shown in the table below. The 
dependent variables are TDM, TDM_FULL, TDB, WIND_TDM and WIND_TDB. TDM is total liabilities divided 
by market capitalization. TDM_FULL is Long-term interest bearing debt plus current portion of long term 
debt divided by market capitalization plus Long-term interest bearing debt plus current portion of long 
term debt minus Deferred taxes and investment tax credit. TDB is total liabilities divided by the book value 
of shareholder equity. WIND_TDM is TDM Winsorized at the 0,5 percentile in both ends. WIND_TDB is TDB 
Winsorized at the 0,5 percentile in both ends. Ln Non-Firm wealth is the natural logarithm of taxable 
wealth minus value at risk in own company. Value at risk was calculated by multiplying the number of 
shares held by the CEO at year-end by closing price per 31. Dec added with the number of options held by 
the CEO multiplied with 0,6 and again with closing price per 31 Dec. The resulting figures were 
inflated/deflated to 2005 figures by using a Norway-specific GNP deflator obtained from the World Bank. 
Profitability is EBITDA divided by total assets. Volatility is 360 days stock volatility. Ln Assets is  is the 
natural logarithm of book assets, deflated/inflated to 2005 figures. Market-to-book is market capitalization 
over book value of assets. Median leverage is the median industry leverage ratio, calculated as total 
liabilities divided by market capitalization, Clustered by 2-digit GICS-Codes for all firms listed on Oslo 
Exchange in the sample period. Term spread is spread between 10 year government bonds and 12 month 
certificates in December of the current accounting year. Tangibility is net property, plant and equipment 
divided by assets. Standard errors are adjusted by clustering for industry and year, and are reported in 
parenthesis. *, ** and *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. ^denotes 
winsorized data is used in WIND_TDM and WIND_TDB regressions. 
Variable TDM TDM_FULL TDB WIND_TDM WIND_TDB 
Ln Non-Firm wealth 0.052*** 0.002* 0.016 0.038** 0.011 
 (0.016) (0.001) (0.012) (0.015) (0.010) 
Profitability^ -3.283** -0.397*** 0.091 -3.480*** -0.120 
 (1.342) (0.131) (0.700) (1.081) (0.685) 
Volatility 0.049*** 0.001*** -0.000 0.037*** 0.010** 
 (0.016) (0.001) (0.013) (0.011) (0.004) 
Ln Assets 0.245* 0.008 -0.062 0.199* -0.015 
 (0.132) (0.010) (0.068) (0.102) (0.053) 
Market-to-book^ -0.297** -0.106*** -0.175** -0.327*** -0.169** 
 (0.133) (0.021) (0.076) (0.117) (0.070) 
Median leverage 0.508* 0.046 0.454* 0.484* 0.552*** 
 (0.302) (0.034) (0.245) (0.269) (0.207) 
Term-Spread -0.438** 0.351*** 0.398 0.736*** 0.415 
 (0.181) (0.042) (0.461) (0.273) (0.398) 
Tangibility 0.694** -0.029*** -0.073 -0.410*** -0.034 
 (0.297) (0.004) (0.080) (0.144) (0.075) 
Number of observations 573 532 573 573 573 
R2 0.192 0.557 0.047 0.232 0.121 
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Wealth at stake 
In the regression on liabilities over market value of equity (TDM), wealth at stake shows 
a negative (-0.011) and highly significant coefficient (at the 1% level). As the coefficient 
is a decimal portion of wealth invested, the interpretation should be treated carefully; A 
one percent increase of the total share invested (i.e. from 10 to 10.1%), and not a one 
percentage point increase (i.e. from 22 to 23%), would entail a 0.011 percent drop in the 
leverage ratio. This finding is consistent with the risk aversion assumption that a higher 
percentage of total wealth invested will increase CEO risk aversion on the firms’ behalf, 
although the effect is very small. If one considers a CEO with 50 percent of wealth 
dependent on firm performance, an increase to 60% would only entail a 0.22 percent 
drop in the leverage ratio. 
The control regression performed on the winsorized ratio (WIND_TDM) show a slightly 
smaller although still significant coefficient (-0.009), which may imply a marginalized 
effect of wealth at stake when correcting for extreme outliers caused by rare events. An 
explanation of the reduced coefficient and significance between the raw and winsorized 
ratio could be that as a company enters severe financial distress, the market value of 
equity is diminished and thus also the CEO percentage of wealth invested in own 
company, all while the capital structure of the firm shifts towards external financing 
only. This feasible causality has not been examined in this paper, and a time-series 
analysis revealing the existence of such causality should be incorporated in future 
research on whether CEO percentage wealth at stake affects leverage ratio. 
For the leverage ratio TDM_FULL, the wealth at stake coefficient is very small (-0.0004) 
and insignificant (P>|t| 0.127), though it should be noted that the sign is still negative. 
No clear conclusions should be drawn from this limited sample, but the lack of 
significance in this ratio compared to the high significance in the TDM ratio is 
interesting, and could be researched further. It should be noted that the number of 
observations is smaller for this ratio, and as the distribution only spans from 0 to 1.14 
(in contrast to the TDM ratio where the maximal observed value is 56.86 and 26.67 for 
the winsorized ratio) the above mentioned causality theory could be the reason. 
As for book leverage, the wealth at stake coefficient shows no significant correlation 
with either the raw- nor winsorized ratio. Only market-to-book and median leverage 
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controls shows a significant relationship with the TDB ratio, which could testify to the 
argument of book leverage being a product of past events.  
Other findings 
The performed regressions also partially support the findings of Frank & Goyal (2009) 
in regard to capital structure determinants. In the regressions of non-firm wealth on 
market leverage, all control variables show a significant coefficient, with the exception of 
assets and median leverage on the TDM_FULL ratio. The latter may be due to the 
calculation of median leverage, as this variable was calculated on the basis of the raw 
TDM which distribution is greatly larger than for the TDM_FULL ratio. 
In the regressions of wealth at stake, the significance of industry leverage and tangibility 
has diminished. As the correlations table show significant relationships between the 
three variables, the previous causality explanation of the wealth at stake figure could be 
applied although no conclusions should be based on this limited sample. 
Consistent with the findings of Frank & Goyal (2009), the TDM_FULL ratio is largely 
explained trough the included control variables. The R2 of both regressions on this 
leverage ratio is over 50%, which is a strong signal considering the limited sample size 
in this paper.  
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Table 3 
Regressions of leverage ratios on wealth at stake 
 
The results of the regressions of leverage ratios on wealth at stake are shown in the table below. The dependent 
variables are TDM, TDM_FULL, TDB, WIND_TDM and WIND_TDB. TDM is total liabilities divided by market 
capitalization. TDM_FULL is Long-term interest bearing debt plus current portion of long term debt divided by market 
capitalization plus Long-term interest bearing debt plus current portion of long term debt minus Deferred taxes and 
investment tax credit. TDB is total liabilities divided by the book value of shareholder equity. WIND_TDM is TDM 
Winsorized at the 0.5 percentile in both ends. WIND_TDB is TDB Winsorized at the 0.5 percentile in both ends. Wealth 
at stake is the percentage (in decimal numbers) of CEO wealth tied to company performance.. Profitability is EBITDA 
divided by total assets. Volatility is 360 days stock volatility. Ln Assets is the natural logarithm of book assets, 
deflated/inflated to 2005 figures. Market-to-book is market capitalization over book value of assets. Median leverage is 
the median industry leverage ratio, calculated as total liabilities divided by market capitalization, Clustered by 2-digit 
GICS-Codes for all firms listed on Oslo Exchange in the sample period. Term spread is spread between 10 year 
government bonds and 12 month certificates in December of the current accounting year. Tangibility is net property, 
plant and equipment divided by assets. Standard errors are adjusted by clustering for industry and year, and are 
reported in parenthesis. *, ** and *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. ^denotes 
winsorized data is used in WIND_TDM and WIND_TDB regressions. 
Variable TDM TDM_FULL TDB WIND_TDM WIND_TDB 
Wealth at stake -0.011*** -0.000 -0.001 -0.009** -0.002 
 (0.004) (0.000) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) 
Profitability^ -3.607** -0.412*** 0.046 -3.802*** -0.186 
 (1.466) (0.131) (0.699) (1.214) (0.705) 
Volatility 0.047*** 0.001** -0.000 0.036*** 0.010** 
 (0.016) (0.001) (0.012) (0.011) (0.004) 
Ln Assets 0.288** 0.010 -0.053 0.233** -0.007 
 (0.141) (0.011) (0.068) (0.108) (0.053) 
Market-to-book^ -0.299** -0.107*** -0.179** -0.328*** -0.171** 
 (0.137) (0.021) (0.074) (0.120) (0.070) 
Median leverage 0.455 0.044 0.466* 0.437* 0.551*** 
 
(0.279) (0.034) (0.242) (0.256) (0.205) 
Term-Spread -0.433** 0.342*** 0.391 0.561** 0.390 
 (0.178) (0.042) (0.436) (0.273) (0.383) 
Tangibility 0.478 -0.029*** -0.077 -0.406*** -0.035 
 (0.308) (0.005) (0.080) (0.141) (0.074) 
Observations 573 532 573 573 573 
R-squared 0.194 0.557 0.045 0.235 0.119 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS: 
 
After reviewing capital structure literature, literature reviewing capital structure 
literature and empirical papers, no single theory is able to point out an absolute truth 
regarding capital structure decisions and how firms choose their levels of debt. There 
are however a few determinants that over a large sample explain some of the observed 
variance, but the decisions still seems to be made arbitrarily by shareholders, the board 
of directors and ultimately with the CEO. 
In a sample of 75 Norwegian companies listed on the Oslo stock exchange between 1998 
and 2011 i examine whether CEO risk aversion, measured by wealth independent of 
company performance and percentage wealth at stake, explains some of the observed 
variation in leverage ratios.  
Several regressions are run, where standard errors in both time and on a firm basis are 
corrected for trough two dimensional clustering. Control variables included in the 
regressions are the key variables defined by Frank & Goyal (2009) in their empirical 
study on leverage ratios. 
Consistent with the hypothesis of this paper, the non-firm wealth of the CEO shows 
significance in explaining market leverage ratios; CEOs with higher non-firm wealth run 
companies with higher leverage ratios. The coefficients are however small, and the 
implications of further confirmation of the findings of this thesis is unclear. 
I also find a relationship between CEO percentage wealth at stake in the company and 
one of the leverage ratios calculated, but due to the chance of causality these results 
should be verified with more analysis.  
Suggestions for further research 
The findings of this preliminary paper in the field of CEO risk aversion versus company 
risk could encourage other researchers to look more closely into this particular problem. 
As the availability of wealth data is limited to Scandinavia, a next step could be to pool 
data on companies in both countries to generate a larger sample and verify whether the 
findings of this paper show consistency on a larger scale.  
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APPENDICES: 
Appendix 1 - List of firms in sample clustered by 2-digit GICS. 
 
GICS Prefix Companies in cluster 
07 
13 
 
 
 
 
15 
20 
 
26 
27 
28 
33 
35 
36 
37 
38 
44 
45 
48 
49 
61 
62 
65 
73 
Yara International 
Statoil, Aker Solutions, Fred Olsen Energy, Petroleum Geo-Services, Subsea 7, Aker, 
Bonheur, DNO International, Farstad Shipping, Sevan Marine, Songa Offshore, Solstad 
Offshore, BW Offshore Limited, Det Norske Oljeselskap, DOF, Siem Offshore, Norwegian 
Energy Corporation, Rem Offshore, Norse Energy Corp., Deep Sea Supply, GC Rieber 
Shipping, I.M. Skaugen, AGR Group, Eidsevik Offshore 
Veidekke, Ekornes, AF Gruppen, Infratek, BWG Homes 
Orkla, Marine Harvest, Austevoll Seafood, Lerøy Seafood Group, SalMar, Cermaq, Rieber 
& Søn, Grieg Seafood,  
Norske Skogindustrier 
Schibsted 
Pronova Biopharma, Algeta, Photocure  
Norsk Hydro, Scana Industrier 
Prosafe, Odim, Hexagon Composites 
Renewable Energy Corporation (REC), Tandberg, Eltek, Q-Free, Nordic Semiconductor  
Kongsberg Gruppen, Kongsberg Automotive 
Axis-Shield 
Wilh. Wilhelmsen, Odfjell, Star Reefers 
Norwegian Air Shuttle 
Telenor 
Hafslund, Arendals Fossekompani 
AktivKapital 
ABG Sundal Collier 
Olav Thon Eiendomsselskap, Norwegian Property 
Tomra Systems, Atea, Opera Software, EDB Business Partner, StepStone 
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 Appendix 2 – Raw stata output 
 
//NON-Firm Wealth: 
 
//TDM adding nonfirm wealth 
 
  
Linear regression with 2D clustered SEs                Number of obs =     573 
                                                       F(  8,   564) =    5.97 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
Number of clusters (companyid) =    65                 R-squared     =  0.1922 
Number of clusters (year) =      14                    Root MSE      =  3.3229 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         TDM |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
nonfirm_real |   .0521951   .0163093     3.20   0.001     .0201608    .0842294 
profitabil~y |  -3.282721   1.341862    -2.45   0.015    -5.918379   -.6470636 
stockvolat~y |   .0486343    .015898     3.06   0.002     .0174078    .0798608 
lnrealassets |   .2448023   .1320122     1.85   0.064    -.0144933    .5040979 
markettobook |  -.2969101   .1332565    -2.23   0.026    -.5586498   -.0351704 
   industlev |   .5081081   .3024587     1.68   0.094    -.0859749    1.102191 
  termspread |  -.4375691   .1810553    -2.42   0.016    -.7931941   -.0819441 
 tangibility |   .6942826   .2974154     2.33   0.020     .1101054     1.27846 
       _cons |  -2.992491     1.8274    -1.64   0.102    -6.581832     .596849 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  
     SE clustered by companyid and year 
  
 
 //TDM_FULL nonfirm wealth 
 
Linear regression with 2D clustered SEs                Number of obs =     532 
                                                       F(  8,   523) =   82.32 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
Number of clusters (companyid) =    63                 R-squared     =  0.5568 
Number of clusters (year) =      14                    Root MSE      =  0.1667 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    tdm_full |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
nonfirm_real |   .0019564   .0011438     1.71   0.088    -.0002907    .0042035 
profitabil~y |  -.3966836   .1309575    -3.03   0.003    -.6539508   -.1394163 
stockvolat~y |   .0013913   .0005254     2.65   0.008     .0003592    .0024234 
lnrealassets |   .0084253   .0104052     0.81   0.418    -.0120159    .0288665 
markettobook |  -.1064511   .0210246    -5.06   0.000    -.1477542   -.0651481 
   industlev |   .0462309   .0338017     1.37   0.172    -.0201728    .1126346 
 tangibility |   .3507541   .0415131     8.45   0.000     .2692011     .432307 
  termspread |  -.0289898   .0044928    -6.45   0.000     -.037816   -.0201636 
       _cons |    .173202   .1251695     1.38   0.167    -.0726947    .4190987 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  
     SE clustered by companyid and year 
  
 //TDB nonfirm wealth 
 
Linear regression with 2D clustered SEs                Number of obs =     573 
                                                       F(  8,   564) =   10.03 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
Number of clusters (companyid) =    65                 R-squared     =  0.0473 
Number of clusters (year) =      14                    Root MSE      =  2.0446 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         tdb |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
nonfirm_real |   .0163859   .0116695     1.40   0.161    -.0065351    .0393068 
profitabil~y |   .0907096   .7004094     0.13   0.897     -1.28502    1.466439 
stockvolat~y |  -.0001441   .0128998    -0.01   0.991    -.0254817    .0251935 
lnrealassets |  -.0624025   .0681144    -0.92   0.360    -.1961913    .0713863 
markettobook |  -.1747684   .0756093    -2.31   0.021    -.3232786   -.0262582 
   industlev |   .4538001   .2449845     1.85   0.064    -.0273932    .9349934 
 tangibility |   .3979027    .460735     0.86   0.388    -.5070634    1.302869 
  termspread |  -.0732182   .0800206    -0.91   0.361    -.2303929    .0839566 
       _cons |    1.81532   1.102307     1.65   0.100    -.3498089    3.980448 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  
     SE clustered by companyid and year 
45 
  
  
 
//WIND TDM 
 
  
Linear regression with 2D clustered SEs                Number of obs =     573 
                                                       F(  8,   564) =    8.29 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
Number of clusters (companyid) =    65                 R-squared     =  0.2322 
Number of clusters (year) =      14                    Root MSE      =  2.5329 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    wind_tdm |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
nonfirm_real |   .0381655   .0147996     2.58   0.010     .0090964    .0672345 
wind_profi~y |   -3.47987    1.08091    -3.22   0.001    -5.602971    -1.35677 
stockvolat~y |   .0373777    .010952     3.41   0.001     .0158661    .0588893 
lnrealassets |   .1992277   .1015321     1.96   0.050    -.0001994    .3986548 
wind_marke~k |  -.3268017   .1174592    -2.78   0.006    -.5575125   -.0960908 
   industlev |   .4835623   .2689024     1.80   0.073    -.0446102    1.011735 
 tangibility |   .7360439   .2731405     2.69   0.007     .1995472    1.272541 
  termspread |  -.4102359   .1436995    -2.85   0.004    -.6924875   -.1279844 
       _cons |  -1.998771   1.327851    -1.51   0.133    -4.606909    .6093656 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  
     SE clustered by companyid and year 
  
 
//WIND TDB 
 
  
Linear regression with 2D clustered SEs                Number of obs =     573 
                                                       F(  8,   564) =   13.02 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
Number of clusters (companyid) =    65                 R-squared     =  0.1208 
Number of clusters (year) =      14                    Root MSE      =  1.3716 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    wind_tdb |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
nonfirm_real |   .0111303   .0095572     1.16   0.245    -.0076417    .0299023 
wind_profi~y |  -.1202156   .6853793    -0.18   0.861    -1.466423    1.225992 
stockvolat~y |   .0101756   .0044302     2.30   0.022     .0014739    .0188774 
lnrealassets |  -.0146447   .0529807    -0.28   0.782    -.1187082    .0894189 
wind_marke~k |  -.1692366   .0698081    -2.42   0.016    -.3063522   -.0321211 
   industlev |   .5519235   .2066191     2.67   0.008     .1460867    .9577604 
 tangibility |   .4150276     .39775     1.04   0.297    -.3662246     1.19628 
  termspread |  -.0340469   .0754247    -0.45   0.652    -.1821946    .1141007 
       _cons |   .8284137   .6781976     1.22   0.222    -.5036877    2.160515 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  
     SE clustered by companyid and year 
  
 
  
//Wealth at stake 
  
//TDM  
 
Linear regression with 2D clustered SEs                Number of obs =     573 
                                                       F(  8,   564) =    6.28 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
Number of clusters (companyid) =    65                 R-squared     =  0.1943 
Number of clusters (year) =      14                    Root MSE      =  3.3187 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         TDM |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
wealthatst~e |  -.0112856   .0038377    -2.94   0.003    -.0188236   -.0037476 
profitabil~y |  -3.607082   1.465869    -2.46   0.014    -6.486311    -.727852 
stockvolat~y |   .0472169    .015585     3.03   0.003     .0166052    .0778285 
lnrealassets |   .2883616   .1412197     2.04   0.042     .0109809    .5657423 
markettobook |  -.2988977   .1365423    -2.19   0.029    -.5670913   -.0307041 
   industlev |   .4553909   .2790501     1.63   0.103    -.0927134    1.003495 
  termspread |   -.432931   .1783913    -2.43   0.016    -.7833234   -.0825386 
 tangibility |   .4775857   .3081683     1.55   0.122    -.1277119    1.082883 
       _cons |  -2.011171   1.699925    -1.18   0.237    -5.350129    1.327786 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  
     SE clustered by companyid and year 
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//TDM_FULL  
 
  
Linear regression with 2D clustered SEs                Number of obs =     532 
                                                       F(  8,   523) =   80.10 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
Number of clusters (companyid) =    63                 R-squared     =  0.5572 
Number of clusters (year) =      14                    Root MSE      =  0.1667 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    tdm_full |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
wealthatst~e |  -.0004146    .000271    -1.53   0.127     -.000947    .0001179 
profitabil~y |  -.4119086   .1312998    -3.14   0.002    -.6698485   -.1539687 
stockvolat~y |   .0013316   .0005216     2.55   0.011     .0003069    .0023562 
lnrealassets |    .010015   .0107461     0.93   0.352    -.0110958    .0311258 
markettobook |  -.1067687     .02149    -4.97   0.000     -.148986   -.0645514 
   industlev |   .0440184   .0338687     1.30   0.194     -.022517    .1105537 
 tangibility |   .3419548    .042028     8.14   0.000     .2593904    .4245192 
  termspread |  -.0289351   .0047617    -6.08   0.000    -.0382895   -.0195807 
       _cons |   .2113612   .1308424     1.62   0.107      -.04568    .4684025 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  
     SE clustered by companyid and year 
  
 
//TDB  
 
  
Linear regression with 2D clustered SEs                Number of obs =     573 
                                                       F(  8,   564) =    9.07 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
Number of clusters (companyid) =    65                 R-squared     =  0.0447 
Number of clusters (year) =      14                    Root MSE      =  2.0475 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         tdb |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
wealthatst~e |  -.0014801   .0041031    -0.36   0.718    -.0095392    .0065791 
profitabil~y |    .045567   .6987104     0.07   0.948    -1.326825    1.417959 
stockvolat~y |  -.0002264   .0124199    -0.02   0.985    -.0246213    .0241684 
lnrealassets |  -.0533616   .0677091    -0.79   0.431    -.1863543    .0796312 
markettobook |   -.179437   .0744496    -2.41   0.016    -.3256694   -.0332047 
   industlev |   .4659318   .2423823     1.92   0.055    -.0101505     .942014 
 tangibility |   .3911774   .4361408     0.90   0.370    -.4654811    1.247836 
  termspread |  -.0771074   .0796991    -0.97   0.334    -.2336507    .0794359 
       _cons |    1.94478   1.057649     1.84   0.066    -.1326317    4.022193 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  
     SE clustered by companyid and year 
  
 
//WIND TDM 
 
  
Linear regression with 2D clustered SEs                Number of obs =     573 
                                                       F(  8,   564) =    8.85 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
Number of clusters (companyid) =    65                 R-squared     =  0.2354 
Number of clusters (year) =      14                    Root MSE      =  2.5274 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    wind_tdm |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
wealthatst~e |  -.0087851   .0039292    -2.24   0.026    -.0165026   -.0010675 
wind_profi~y |  -3.802037    1.21366    -3.13   0.002    -6.185883   -1.418191 
stockvolat~y |   .0361949    .010815     3.35   0.001     .0149524    .0574374 
lnrealassets |    .232929   .1081714     2.15   0.032     .0204611     .445397 
wind_marke~k |  -.3277407    .120015    -2.73   0.007    -.5634716   -.0920098 
   industlev |   .4370232   .2561237     1.71   0.089    -.0660495     .940096 
 tangibility |   .5609112   .2731936     2.05   0.041     .0243101    1.097512 
  termspread |  -.4061088   .1412524    -2.88   0.004    -.6835537   -.1286638 
       _cons |  -1.228357   1.283855    -0.96   0.339    -3.750078    1.293364 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  
     SE clustered by companyid and year 
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//WIND TDB 
 
  
Linear regression with 2D clustered SEs                Number of obs =     573 
                                                       F(  8,   564) =   12.18 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
Number of clusters (companyid) =    65                 R-squared     =  0.1194 
Number of clusters (year) =      14                    Root MSE      =  1.3726 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    wind_tdb |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
wealthatst~e |   -.001677   .0023215    -0.72   0.470    -.0062367    .0028828 
wind_profi~y |  -.1857493   .7046155    -0.26   0.792     -1.56974    1.198242 
stockvolat~y |   .0099898   .0042342     2.36   0.019      .001673    .0183066 
lnrealassets |  -.0067983   .0530038    -0.13   0.898    -.1109073    .0973106 
wind_marke~k |  -.1711827   .0695283    -2.46   0.014    -.3077487   -.0346167 
   industlev |   .5508241   .2050088     2.69   0.007     .1481502     .953498 
 tangibility |   .3903963   .3828965     1.02   0.308    -.3616809    1.142473 
  termspread |  -.0350663   .0737759    -0.48   0.635    -.1799754    .1098427 
       _cons |    .975402    .697456     1.40   0.163    -.3945264     2.34533 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  
     SE clustered by companyid and year 
 
